The Violence of Law and Order Politics: The Case of Law Enforcement Candidates in Brazil
Candidates in the developing world often say that they will bring down crime and violence, but what do these law and order candidates achieve after taking office? I argue that even if their law and order policies curb criminal activity, either because the police forces of these countries are ineffective and abusive, or because crackdowns can disrupt the equilibrium among rival criminal gangs, murders may increase. However, it is unlikely that the loss of human lives will cause any political backlash because they fall mostly on politically marginalized young men. This paper first characterizes law and order candidates, and then examines the effects of their election on public security spending, crime, and homicides. Implementing an electoral regression discontinuity design in Brazil that compares municipalities with a winning law and order council candidate versus others where that type of candidate ran for but ultimately lost, this paper shows where they win spend- ing in public security rises. This extra spending indicates actions against crime, which turn out to be modestly effective. At the same time, however, homicides surge among poor, non–white men.
Candidates in the developing world often say that they will bring down crime and violence, but what do these law and order candidates achieve after taking office? I argue that even if their law and order policies curb criminal activity, either because the police forces of these countries are ineffective and abusive, or because crackdowns can disrupt the equilibrium among rival criminal gangs, murders may increase. However, it is unlikely that the loss of human lives will cause any political backlash because they fall mostly on politically marginalized young men. This paper first characterizes law and order candidates, and then examines the effects of their election on public security spending, crime, and homicides. Implementing an electoral regression discontinuity design in Brazil that compares municipalities with a winning law and order council candidate versus others where that type of candidate ran for but ultimately lost, this paper shows where they win spend- ing in public security rises. This extra spending indicates actions against crime, which turn out to be modestly effective. At the same time, however, homicides surge among poor, non–white men.
The exit trap: the gender gap in political perseverance
(Working paper)
Higher entry barriers only partly explains why in almost all democracies there are fewer women than men in politics, since remaining in politics may also be disproportionately costly for women. Using a novel regression discontinuity design in Brazilian open-list PR elections, this article uncovers a substantial perseverance deficit for women. Only 47% of women who barely lost an election for an entry-level office compete in elections again, a rate 26 percentage points lower than winning candidates, and 13 p.p. lower than losing men, even when all competed in the same election, had at most 10 votes of difference among them, and would eventually face the same voters and competitors in a subsequent race. Additional tests show that losing women are less likely to run again for higher-ranked political offices, and are less likely to join a different party in the future, denoting discrimination from party elites. Results indicate that policies encouraging women to become candidates only, such as list quotas, may be ineffective closing the gender gap
Presented at: IAST, EPSA 2017.
(Working paper)
Higher entry barriers only partly explains why in almost all democracies there are fewer women than men in politics, since remaining in politics may also be disproportionately costly for women. Using a novel regression discontinuity design in Brazilian open-list PR elections, this article uncovers a substantial perseverance deficit for women. Only 47% of women who barely lost an election for an entry-level office compete in elections again, a rate 26 percentage points lower than winning candidates, and 13 p.p. lower than losing men, even when all competed in the same election, had at most 10 votes of difference among them, and would eventually face the same voters and competitors in a subsequent race. Additional tests show that losing women are less likely to run again for higher-ranked political offices, and are less likely to join a different party in the future, denoting discrimination from party elites. Results indicate that policies encouraging women to become candidates only, such as list quotas, may be ineffective closing the gender gap
Presented at: IAST, EPSA 2017.
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Exogenous commodity shocks and the electoral returns to office: evidence from Brazil (working paper, with Luis Schiumerini)
Do external shocks to the economy affect the electoral fortunes of incumbents? Drawing data from Brazilian municipal elections, this paper shows that while increases in the price of agricultural commodities greatly enhance the probability of reelection of incumbent mayors, negative shocks place them at an incumbency disadvantage vis-à-vis challengers. Coupling a measure of exogenous price volatility for each municipality with a ``close election'' regression discontinuity design, we rule out alternative explanations pointing to differences in incumbents and challengers, strategic candidate entry and exit, or structural differences across municipalities. Furthermore, we show that commodity inflation is particularly consequential in rural municipalities, and that the electoral success of incumbents only responds to inflation during the last year of an incumbent's term. By showing that voters cannot adequately distinguish exogenous factors from incumbents' actions nor evaluate performance during a full incumbent term, we contribute to the growing evidence on the limitations of retrospective voting. We also underscore that exposure to adverse economic shocks, which afflicts many developing economies, may represent a heretofore unrecognized failure of democratic accountability. Presented at Sciences Po 2017, MPSA 2015, APSA 2015. |
Edited democracy? Evidence of media slant in the coverage of presidential debates (working paper with Alexsandros Cavgias, Raphael Corbi, and Luis Meloni)
This paper investigates if slanted news coverage can affect electoral outcomes by analyzing the case of a presidential debate news coverage. The media helps voters familiarize with candidates by covering campaign events, exposing political platforms and broadcasting debates. However media organizations are not necessarily neutral messengers. Measuring the impact of the edited coverage on electoral outcomes net of the direct effect of the debate is particularly hard as they tend to be almost simultaneously broadcast by different media outlets with varying reach across regions. We take advantage of a unique natural experiment regarding the geographical distribution of broadcaster-specific TV signal in order to disentangle the coverage effect from the debate itself. Specifically, we focus on the impact of Globo's debate coverage of the 1989 Presidential election debate. Our baseline estimates using actual electoral data and survey data show that Lula lost around 1.8 percentage points in vote share due to Globo's unfavorable coverage. Our contributions to the literature is twofold. First, we precisely identify the effect of one episode in which a media filter played a significant role in the outcome of a national election. Second, the case of the 1989 Presidential election is of particular interest as an environment of a non-consolidated democracy with voters that have limited electoral experience and face uncertainty regarding candidates.
This paper investigates if slanted news coverage can affect electoral outcomes by analyzing the case of a presidential debate news coverage. The media helps voters familiarize with candidates by covering campaign events, exposing political platforms and broadcasting debates. However media organizations are not necessarily neutral messengers. Measuring the impact of the edited coverage on electoral outcomes net of the direct effect of the debate is particularly hard as they tend to be almost simultaneously broadcast by different media outlets with varying reach across regions. We take advantage of a unique natural experiment regarding the geographical distribution of broadcaster-specific TV signal in order to disentangle the coverage effect from the debate itself. Specifically, we focus on the impact of Globo's debate coverage of the 1989 Presidential election debate. Our baseline estimates using actual electoral data and survey data show that Lula lost around 1.8 percentage points in vote share due to Globo's unfavorable coverage. Our contributions to the literature is twofold. First, we precisely identify the effect of one episode in which a media filter played a significant role in the outcome of a national election. Second, the case of the 1989 Presidential election is of particular interest as an environment of a non-consolidated democracy with voters that have limited electoral experience and face uncertainty regarding candidates.
The new left in broker-mediated party systems
(book chapter in progress, with Thad Dunning)
With the growth of economic informality, the transformation of traditional left party-union linkages, and the rise of political decentralization, local intermediaries have played an increasingly critical role in shaping political participation, interest intermediation, and distributive exchange in Latin America. Left parties in the region— even those who are externally mobilized or who advance unambiguous programmatic goals—have often needed to negotiate with such local "brokers" when seeking to capture popular-sector constituencies electorally. In this chapter, we consider the resources that intermediaries offer to parties but also the challenges broker-mediated incorporation poses for left parties. We focus on several dimensions of variation: the durability of brokers’ partisan linkages; the resources they can offer for electoral mobilization; and the degree and nature of horizontal competition between brokers. We then use new evidence from Brazil to assess possible implications of broker-mediated incorporation for political accountability, economic distribution, and the autonomous mobilization of popular sectors.
(book chapter in progress, with Thad Dunning)
With the growth of economic informality, the transformation of traditional left party-union linkages, and the rise of political decentralization, local intermediaries have played an increasingly critical role in shaping political participation, interest intermediation, and distributive exchange in Latin America. Left parties in the region— even those who are externally mobilized or who advance unambiguous programmatic goals—have often needed to negotiate with such local "brokers" when seeking to capture popular-sector constituencies electorally. In this chapter, we consider the resources that intermediaries offer to parties but also the challenges broker-mediated incorporation poses for left parties. We focus on several dimensions of variation: the durability of brokers’ partisan linkages; the resources they can offer for electoral mobilization; and the degree and nature of horizontal competition between brokers. We then use new evidence from Brazil to assess possible implications of broker-mediated incorporation for political accountability, economic distribution, and the autonomous mobilization of popular sectors.
Modular Parties: making clientelism work in volatile systems
(working paper)
How do weakly-institutionalized parties make clientelism work in electorally volatile party systems? In this article I argue that parties do not have to build patron--client linkages from the ground up when local notables have already established them. If parties incorporate local bosses into their organizations, the parties will forge local connections and have access to local notables to broker votes. However, the relationship between parties and local authorities only works as long as parties have access to state resources. When this flow is curtailed, such as when subnational candidates lose elections, the vertical bonds between parties and local authorities are severed. When power changes hands, a new incumbent will form alliances with local notables. I test this model in Brazil, and I show that when gubernatorial candidates win close elections, their parties are able to field more mayoral candidates and subsequently gain more seats in Congress. The same pattern holds on a smaller scale when congressional candidates win their elections. The model helps to explain why clientelistic party systems are stable when parties are not.
Presented at: 2015 Brokering Votes Conference - Berkeley 2015, APSA 2015.
(working paper)
How do weakly-institutionalized parties make clientelism work in electorally volatile party systems? In this article I argue that parties do not have to build patron--client linkages from the ground up when local notables have already established them. If parties incorporate local bosses into their organizations, the parties will forge local connections and have access to local notables to broker votes. However, the relationship between parties and local authorities only works as long as parties have access to state resources. When this flow is curtailed, such as when subnational candidates lose elections, the vertical bonds between parties and local authorities are severed. When power changes hands, a new incumbent will form alliances with local notables. I test this model in Brazil, and I show that when gubernatorial candidates win close elections, their parties are able to field more mayoral candidates and subsequently gain more seats in Congress. The same pattern holds on a smaller scale when congressional candidates win their elections. The model helps to explain why clientelistic party systems are stable when parties are not.
Presented at: 2015 Brokering Votes Conference - Berkeley 2015, APSA 2015.
THE VALUE OF THE VOTE: HOW MUCH DO BROKERS RECEIVE FOR THEIR EFFORTS?
(Working paper in preparation, with Klenio Barbosa)
Peer-Reviewed Publications
2018 - "Disloyal Brokers and Weak Parties" - American Journal of Political Science 62.1
2010 - "The effect of re-election on health expenditures: an analysis of the reputation-building model". Brazilian Review of Political Economy (Revista de Economia Política) - v. 30, p. 140-158. (with Enlinson Mattos, and in Portuguese)
2009 - "Scale economies in the supply of health services: a study of São Paulo Municipalities". Revista ANPEC, v. 10, p. 357-386. (with Paulo Arvate, Enlinson Mattos, Veronica Orellano, and Fabiana Rocha)
Non Peer-Reviewed
2018 - DECEPÇÃO À VISTA
Revista Época, 22 de março 2018
2010 - MEXICO CENTENNIAL: LIMITED INDEPENDENCE, LIMITED DEMOCRACY
(with Sinaia Urrusti-Frenk)
Berkeley Review of Latin American Studies
(Working paper in preparation, with Klenio Barbosa)
Peer-Reviewed Publications
2018 - "Disloyal Brokers and Weak Parties" - American Journal of Political Science 62.1
2010 - "The effect of re-election on health expenditures: an analysis of the reputation-building model". Brazilian Review of Political Economy (Revista de Economia Política) - v. 30, p. 140-158. (with Enlinson Mattos, and in Portuguese)
2009 - "Scale economies in the supply of health services: a study of São Paulo Municipalities". Revista ANPEC, v. 10, p. 357-386. (with Paulo Arvate, Enlinson Mattos, Veronica Orellano, and Fabiana Rocha)
Non Peer-Reviewed
2018 - DECEPÇÃO À VISTA
Revista Época, 22 de março 2018
2010 - MEXICO CENTENNIAL: LIMITED INDEPENDENCE, LIMITED DEMOCRACY
(with Sinaia Urrusti-Frenk)
Berkeley Review of Latin American Studies
